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SEMIOTICS, ANALOGICAL LEGAL
REASONING, AND THE Cf. CITATION:
GETTING OUR SIGNALS UNCROSSED
IRA P. ROBBINS†
ABSTRACT
The Bluebook’s introductory citation signals are essential to
effective legal discourse. The choice of signal can influence not only
the interpretation of cited cases, but also the path of the law. In this
Article, Professor Ira Robbins examines one commonly used signal:
the cf. After exploring its semiotic function, he details the multitude of
ways in which this signal has been used and misused. He argues that
lawyers’ and judges’ careless use of the cf. leads to confusing and
often incoherent developments in the law, and concludes by proposing
a precise working definition for this irksome, but potentially powerful,
citation signal.

INTRODUCTION
Legal writers often complain about the form of legal discourse to
the point where seemingly inconsequential esoterica receive the
passionate scrutiny of the well-intentioned analyst.1 But introductory
signals—which may be the epitome of form—draw considerable fire
for good reason: they are often poorly defined, prompting both
inconsistent usage and great confusion.2
Copyright © 1999 by Ira P. Robbins. All rights reserved.
† Barnard T. Welsh Scholar and Professor of Law and Justice, American University,
Washington College of Law; A.B. 1970, University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1973, Harvard
University. I am grateful to my colleague Michael Tigar for taking the time to read and
comment on an earlier draft of this Article. I also thank Joshua S. Millard and Andrea S. Tisi
for their excellent research assistance and the American University Law School Research Fund
for providing financial support.
1. See, e.g., Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38, 38 (1936) (stating
that the only two things wrong with law review articles are their style and their content); Fred
Rodell, Comment, Goodbye to Law Reviews—Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279, 289 (1962)
(describing footnotes as “phony excrescences”).
2. Judicial opinions refer to The Bluebook rules regarding introductory signals more than
to any other citation rules. See A. Darby Dickerson, An Un-Uniform System of Citation:
Surviving with the New Bluebook (Including Compendia of State and Federal Court Rules
Concerning Citation Form), 26 STETSON L. REV. 53, 68 (1996). This Article analyzes selected
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While their definitions may be poor, however, introductory
signals clearly serve two major purposes: they “indicate the purposes
for which the citations are made and the degree of support the
citations give.”3 Other meanings may exist, of course. For example,
two authors have suggested that academic legal citation also fulfills
the obligation to indicate familiarity with certain authorities and may
signal a group identity or theoretical perspective.4 Another
commentator has sought to determine whether judicial citation seeks
primarily to justify certain results rather than to explain the actual
reasoning behind decisions.5 Alternatively, perhaps we simply expect
too much from legal citation signals.6
One attribute of introductory signals is paramount: in subtle and
sometimes not-so-subtle ways, they help to determine the future
direction of the law. Thus, to the extent that the signals are defined

judicial interpretations of ambiguous cf. cites. See infra Part II. Numerous legal commentators
have also criticized introductory signals, often while reviewing the latest citation manual. See,
e.g., Richard L. Bowler, Book Review, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 700 (1977) (reviewing A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 12th ed. 1976));
Mary I. Coombs, Lowering One’s Cites: A (Sort Of) Review of the University of Chicago
Manual of Legal Citation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1106-11 (1990); Dickerson, supra, at 68-70;
Peter Lushing, A Uniform System of Citation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 599 (1967) (reviewing A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 11th ed. 1967));
Peter Phillips, Book Note, A Uniform System of Citation, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 199, 199-200
(1987) (reviewing A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds.,
14th ed. 1986)). Such criticism may reflect the practice of what two authors have termed,
perhaps ironically, “[c]itology, the study of citations.” J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, How to
Win Cites and Influence People, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 843, 843 (1996); see also Dickerson,
supra, at 66-70 (reviewing several changes in signal definitions and arguing that similar changes
“destroy any hope of building a truly uniform citation system”); James W. Paulsen, An
Uninformed System of Citation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1780, 1791 (1992).
3. THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION Rule 1 (Columbia Law Review
Ass’n et al. eds., 16th ed. 1996) [hereinafter BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN]. It is also generally agreed
that legal citations “give credit for borrowed material,” William R. Slomanson, Footnote Logic
in Law Review Writing: Previously Unaddressed in the Criminal Justice System, 9 CRIM. JUST. J.
65, 68 (1986), and “allow the reader to locate a cited source accurately and efficiently,”
BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra, at I.2.
4. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 860-61, 868.
5. See David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from
State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 L. & SOC. REV. 337 (1997). Walsh provides a
valuable overview of social science studies examining the function that citation serves in
judicial opinions. See id.
6. Judge Wilfred Feinberg, using the eleventh edition of The Bluebook, summed up the
inherent ambiguity in employing any introductory signal: “Such substantive reliance on citation
forms suggests too much for the ‘glorious inscrutibility’ [sic] of introductory signals.” Beaney v.
United States, 271 F. Supp. 692, 696 (W.D.N.Y. 1967) (misquoting Lushing, supra note 2, at
601).
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incorrectly or used imprecisely, they affect the analogical reasoning
process that is at the foundation of common law jurisprudence.
While there are numerous introductory citation signals—many
susceptible to broad criticisms and that merit further analysis7—this
Article focuses on the cf. signal. Because it is the weakest of the
citation signals that indicate support (according to The Bluebook8), it
is the most intellectually challenging one. It is also the least well
understood signal; thus, it is in the greatest need of increased
precision.
9
Lambrix v. Singletary, a recent Supreme Court opinion,
demonstrates the potential ramifications of citing a case with the cf.
signal. Capital prisoner Cary Michael Lambrix’s death sentence hung
on the interpretation of the cf. The case presented the question
whether Lambrix could successfully challenge his sentence because
the aggravating factors considered by the jury were later ruled

7. This Article focuses on the cf. signal. However, the see signal could also use further
analysis, as several decisions demonstrate. Compare Schmidt v. McCarthy, 369 F.2d 176, 182
n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (noting the court’s use of the see signal in Milone v. English, 306 F.2d 814
(D.C. Cir. 1962), and explaining that it was used “to indicate that ‘the asserted opinion or
conclusion will be suggested by an examination of the cited authority’” (quoting A UNIFORM
SYSTEM OF CITATION 27:2:3 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 10th ed. 1958)
[hereinafter BLUEBOOK TEN]) with National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 897 F. Supp.
1047, 1062 n.14 (N.D. Ill. 1995). In Scheidler, the court stated that “this court need not follow
the letter of the Seventh Circuit's ruling and assume, without analysis, that section 1367 applies
because of the ‘see’ signal.” Id. at 1062 n.14. It interpreted the see signal as “directing the
reader’s attention to the statute to show the general legal theory supporting its conclusion that
the counts were to be reinstated.” Id.
Scheidler points up another problem with changing definitions of signals. In one edition
of The Bluebook, the see signal may be used to suggest an inferential step between the
authority and the proposition offered, while [no signal] is used to introduce “on point”
authority. See BLUEBOOK TEN, supra, 27:2. By contrast, the sixteenth edition uses see to show
direct support while reserving [no signal] to identify sources or attribute quotes. See
BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a). In Scheidler, the district court interpreted see as
indirect support akin to see generally. See Scheidler, 897 F. Supp at 1062; see also Beaney, 271 F.
Supp. at 696; State v. Oltmanns, 519 N.W.2d 602, 606 (S.D. 1994) (Henderson, J., concurring)
(criticizing the majority’s use of compare to give more weight to a dissent than it merited).
The change regarding the see signal alone ought to prompt considerable controversy, for
not only can evolving definitions lead to confusion in interpretation of signal use, see Donald H.
Gjerdingen, A Uniform System of Citation, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 499, 510 (1978)
(reviewing A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 12th
ed. 1976)) (“The tragedy is that one edition’s signals are meaningless to a person schooled in a
different edition.”), but also the new use of the see signal may not be an improvement over
earlier uses.
8. The cf. signal is listed last among the introductory signals “that indicate support” in
The Bluebook. BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a).
9. 520 U.S. 518 (1997).
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unconstitutional in a different case.10 Eight years before Lambrix, the
Court’s general holding in Teague v. Lane11 had forbidden retroactive
application of “new” constitutional rules of criminal procedure to
final convictions on collateral review.12 The Lambrix Court decided
that its later ruling in Espinosa v. Florida13 was not available to
Lambrix because it was a new rule not dictated by existing precedent
and the Constitution at the time his conviction became final.14
Emphasizing that Espinosa’s conclusion was not compelled by extant
precedent, Justice Scalia observed:
The [Espinosa] opinion cited only a single case, Baldwin v. Alabama,
472 U.S. 372, 382 (1985), in support of its central conclusion that
indirect weighing of an invalid aggravator “creates the same
potential for arbitrariness” as direct weighing of an invalid
aggravator. And it introduced that lone citation with a “cf.”—an
introductory signal which shows authority that supports the point in
dictum or by analogy, not one that “controls” or “dictates” the
15
result.

Baldwin, however, arguably did establish that the Court’s ruling in
16
Espinosa was not an unprecedented leap of reason. Curiously,
neither of the two Lambrix dissents defended the citation to Baldwin.
The fact that Espinosa introduced Baldwin with a cf. signal helps
explain why the Lambrix majority failed to analyze potentially
contradictory Supreme Court statements concerning the novelty of
the principle it propounded. As exemplified in Lambrix, cf. citations
are frequently used but rarely, if ever, explained. Moreover, they are
often viewed with skepticism. One observer has even speculated that
10. See id. at 518.
11. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
12. See id. at 310.
13. 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992) (per curiam) (“[A]n aggravating circumstance is invalid in
this sense if its description is so vague as to leave the sentencer without sufficient guidance for
determining the presence or absence of the factor. We have held instructions more specific and
elaborate than the one given in the instant case unconstitutionally vague.”).
14. See Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 539-40.
15. Id. at 529 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Espinosa, 505 U.S. at 1082).
16. The Baldwin Court stated that a defendant’s argument “conceivably might have merit if the judge actually were required to consider the jury’s ‘sentence’ as a recommendation as
to the sentence the jury believed would be appropriate, and if the judge were obligated to
accord some deference to it.” Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 382 (1985) (citation omitted).
The Espinosa case originated in Florida, a state that requires its judges “to pay deference to a
jury's sentencing recommendation.” Espinosa, 505 U.S. at 1082. Intriguingly, the Baldwin
Court itself cited Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), with a cf. signal to support the first
sentence quoted above. See Baldwin, 472 U.S. at 382.
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legal writers use the cf. signal when they wish to impress the reader
with the breadth of their research.17 For those who have not read or
had experience with the citation rules, the process of interpreting
such carelessly used citations can be either exasperating or
completely cryptic.18 Expert legal writers often fare no better, and
many have found fault with the use and misuse of the cf. signal.19
Eminent jurist Robert Bork, for example, offered the following
reprobation: “As the majority presumably recognized, since it cited
[a prior decision] with a cf., the case is probably inapposite.”20 What,
then, is the true value of the cf. signal? This Article attempts to
answer that question from a semiotic perspective, examining how the
cf. signal may operate in both theory and practice.
In Part I, this Article presents a history of the meaning and use
of the cf. signal, with particular reference to semiotics as a theoretical
construct through which to evaluate it. Part II takes this theoretical
construct and applies it to a variety of judicial decisions that use and
analyze the cf. citation. In addition, Part II highlights the spectrum of
cf. decisions, and the implications of the ambiguity and contradiction
in the use of this signal. Finally, Part III integrates theory and judicial
practice and proposes an approach to cf. usage that should lead to
greater clarity and understanding.

17. See Lushing, supra note 2, at 601 (“Use cf. when you’ve wasted your time reading the
case.”).
18. See FREDERICK BERNAYS WEINER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS
223 (2d ed. 1961) (describing introductory signals as “a virtually cryptographic code”);
Coombs, supra note 2, at 1110 (“[T]he standard citations forms have the virtue of using
linguistic ambiguity to avoid confronting delicate theoretical or political issues.”).
19. The quarrels are often quite contentious. See Czerkies v. United States Dep’t of
Labor, 73 F.3d 1435, 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“Rodrigues
gave [the case cited by the Ninth Circuit] a ‘cf.’ citation; the correct signal would have been
‘contra.’”). Incidentally, The Bluebook no longer includes the contra signal in its list of signals.
Compare THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION Rule 1.2(a) (Columbia Law
Review Ass’n et al. eds., 15th ed. 1991) [hereinafter BLUEBOOK FIFTEEN] Rule 1.2(c), with
BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(c). Under the fifteenth edition, one would use
contra when the “[c]ited authority directly states the contrary of the proposition.” BLUEBOOK
FIFTEEN, supra, 1.2(c).
20. Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 312 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., joined by
Scalia, Starr, Silberman, & Buckley, JJ., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en
banc).
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I. SEMIOTICS, THE ROLE OF SIGNALS, AND THE Cf. CITATION: HAZY
DEFINITIONS, CLEAR FUNCTIONS
A. Analogical Reasoning and the Problem of Cf. Definition
Few readers of law journals require an education in the meaning
of reasoning by analogy. Both law students and judges (as well as
many lawyers) engage in the process daily. Suffice it to say for
present purposes, therefore, that, in every case necessitating the
application of law to fact, the judge must determine the extent to
which existing precedent governs the instant case. If the court deems
the precedent to be “close,” the court will treat the precedent either
as controlling or as influential and apply it to the case accordingly. If,
on the other hand, the court focuses on one or more factors to
distinguish existing precedent, then the court will either have to find
closer precedent or treat the case as one of first impression and
formulate an appropriate rule of decision.
This notion of “closeness”—or degree of separation—is inherent
in the process of analogical reasoning. Judges, through their opinions,
move in interstitial ways.21 This notion of closeness is also inherent in
legal citation practice, for introductory signals “indicate the purposes
for which the citations are made and the degree of support the
citations give.”22 In this way, citation signals help to pave the path of
the law. By helping to assign the degree of support and the strength
of distinctions and reconciliations, they help to articulate the degree
of departure from existing law. If the signposts are bad, so too may be
the destination. We must therefore take utmost care to be true to the
intended development of the law. Put differently, careless citation
practice can lead to haphazard consequences that should be
controlled to the extent desired and to the extent possible.
Despite the laudable goals of citation practice, the cf. signal is
viewed with skepticism. One reason is that practical definitions and
uses of the signal vary widely. The Bluebook authors explicitly grant
21. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do
so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.”); BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 103 (1921) (“We must keep within those
interstitial limits which precedent and custom and the long and silent and almost indefinable
practice of other judges through the centuries of the common law have set to judge-made
innovations.”).
22. BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.
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the cf. signal the terrain of analogical legal reasoning.23 Other writers
implicitly do the same, reserving cf. for cited authorities that involve
substantially different facts,24 law,25or both.26 Black’s Law Dictionary
effectively portrays the cf. as a catchall for any point the author
wishes to make.27 Cf. might be short for “cipher”—it is a nebulous
introductory signal, practically devoid of meaning without further
explanation by the author.28 Or cf. might simply mean “can’t find”:
aware that a particular proposition requires support, the author,
unable to locate anything close, just cites a book, article, or case that
is “close enough.”
Another reason that the cf. signal may attract criticism is that
different generations of lawyers and authors remember it differently
23. The authors of The Bluebook first made passing reference to analogical reasoning
under the cf. signal more than forty years ago. See A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, Rule
VIII(A)(1)(d) (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 9th ed. 1955) (stating that the cf. signal
should be used “before a case, statute, or secondary [authority] expressing a legal proposition
which, while only analogous, lends some support for the statement, conclusion, or opinion of
law in text”).
24. See MILES O. PRICE & HARRY BITNER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL RESEARCH 389 (3d ed.
1969) (“Where the dictum, though deriving from substantially different facts, is sufficiently in
point to be cited in the discussion, substitute italicized ‘Cf.’ for ‘See.’”). The tenth edition of The
Bluebook linked the cf. signal to authorities that discussed different facts and law, but the factrelated portion of its definition is particularly striking: “‘Cf.,’ rather than ‘accord,’ is
appropriate whenever a factual distinction between the text and the authority is of such legal
significance that the proposition of law must be materially different.” BLUEBOOK TEN, supra
note 7, Rule 27:2:4.
25. See Casey v. Transamerica Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 511 F.2d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 1975)
(Pell, J., dissenting) (evaluating the use of a cf. citation to a similar factual situation analyzed
under discrete law and stating that “[t]he case . . . is properly cited with a ‘Cf.’ reference
because it is not[, like the present controversy,] a reinstatement case”); JOYCE J. GEORGE,
JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING HANDBOOK 252 (3d ed. 1993) (defining cf. as “[a]n abbreviation
for confer which translates into ‘compare’ and indicates that while the material cited lends
support to the proposition advanced, it is directed to another point”); see also Alaska v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 980 F.2d 761, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (approving cf. use where “[t]he
theory underlying both decisions is the same”).
26. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 529 (1997) (describing cf. as “an introductory
signal which shows authority that supports the point in dictum or by analogy, not one that
‘controls’ or ‘dictates’ the result”); MILES O. PRICE, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF STANDARD
LEGAL CITATIONS 58 (1958) (employing a definition nearly identical to that present in PRICE
& BITNER, supra note 24, at 389, with the exception of a parenthetical: “Where the dictum in a
cited case, though deriving from substantially different facts (or the case is otherwise
distinguishable from the situation being discussed), is sufficiently in point . . . .”) (emphasis
added)).
27. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 229 (6th ed. 1990) (defining cf. as a signal that
“[d]irects the reader’s attention to another part of the work, to another volume, case, etc.,
where contrasted, analogous, or explanatory views or statements may be found”).
28. See BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a) (“The citation’s relevance will
usually be clear to the reader only if it is explained.”).
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and therefore use it differently. The authors of The Bluebook altered
its definition albeit subtly almost every time the manual was
printed between 1947 and 1996.29 For example, the seventh edition of
The Bluebook, printed in 1947, recommended the cf. signal when a
case “is parallel to the proposition for which it is cited but contains
facts materially different.”30 Eight years later, the ninth edition
suggested using cf. “before a case, statute, or secondary [authority]
expressing a legal proposition which, while only analogous, lends
some support for the statement, conclusion, or opinion of law in
text.”31 In 1958, the tenth edition made more extensive changes:





“Cf.” is used to introduce any authority which supports a statement,
conclusion, or opinion of law different from that in text but
sufficiently analogous to lend some support to the text. “Cf.” is
never used to support a statement of fact.
“Cf.,” rather than “accord,” is appropriate whenever a factual
distinction between the text and the authority is of such legal
significance that the proposition of law must be materially different.
“Cf.,” rather than “see,” is appropriate whenever the proposition
supported by the authority is not relevant directly to that advanced
32
by text but only analogous to it.

The eleventh edition included an only slightly reworded version
of the first sentence contained in the tenth edition,33 and eliminated
the second paragraph entirely. The thirteenth edition added a new
sentence, one directly relevant to the present discussion: “The [cf.]
citation’s relevance will usually be clear to the reader only if it is

29. See Dickerson, supra note 2, app. C-1 at 212; id. at 67 (listing introductory signal
definitions from the fifteenth and sixteenth editions of The Bluebook); id. at 55 n.1 (identifying
the dates of publication for the seventh edition, which commenced the practice of defining
introductory signals, and the fourteenth edition, which contained the most recent adjustment).
Law journals introduced the cf. signal, which had little legal tradition prior to its introduction in
the first half of the century. See WEINER, supra note 18, at 223.
30. A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 7th ed.
1947); see also Dickerson, supra note 2, app. C-1 at 212.
31. A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 9th ed.
1955); see also Dickerson, supra note 2, app. C-1 at 214.
32. BLUEBOOK TEN, supra note 7, Rule 27:2:4; see also Dickerson, supra note 2, app. C-1
at 215.
33. See A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION Rule 26:1 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al.
eds., 11th ed. 1967) [hereinafter BLUEBOOK ELEVEN] (“Cited authority supports a statement,
opinion, or conclusion of law different from that in text but sufficiently analogous to lend some
support to the text.”); see also Dickerson, supra note 2, app. C-1 at 216.
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explained.”34 The fifteenth edition then added a sentence that
remains in the present sixteenth edition: “Parenthetical explanations,
however brief, are therefore strongly recommended.”35
When the editors of The Bluebook modified the definition and
usage of the cf. signal six times in thirty-nine years,36 they may have
inadvertently changed the common law as well.37 Current judges apply
contemporary signal definitions in construing older cases that employ
signals whose definitions have changed, undoubtedly leading to
confusion. This possibility is deeply disturbing because introductory
signals arise out of the necessity of citing authority under the rule of
law, as well as under The Bluebook.38 Despite developments in legal
criticism,39 the precept that similar situations should receive similar
judicial treatment retains obvious appeal.40 Such treatment—the rule
of law—is integral to the long-standing judicial doctrine of stare
decisis, which obligates judges to follow prior decisions. Thus, a
modern system of citation ought to insulate writers from accidental
misinterpretation of citations and inoculate judges from accidental
departures from previous judgments.
Moreover, despite the exhortation of the most recent version of
41
The Bluebook, cf. citations still go largely unexplained. Many courts
34. A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION Rule 2.2(a) (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al.
eds., 13th ed. 1981).
35. BLUEBOOK FIFTEEN, supra note 19, Rule 1.2(a); BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3,
Rule 1.2(a) (citation omitted).
36. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text; see also J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v.
M.K., 804 P.2d 689, 697 n.12 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (recognizing that the definition of the see
also signal had changed between the twelfth and fourteenth editions of The Bluebook).
37. See Dickerson, supra note 2, at 69 (“Authors use signals to indicate the purpose for
which an authority is cited and the weight with which an authority supports or contradicts a
particular proposition. Changing what the signals mean effectively changes the substance of our
common law.” (citation omitted) (citing Bowler, supra note 2, at 701 (arguing that even subtle
changes in the definitions of signals result in “signals in one generation of law reviews
denot[ing] a set of significations that could be inconsistent with the usages known to a later
generation”))).
38. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
39. See generally Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From
Langdell and Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REV. 353 (1995) (reviewing the methods
and dominant themes of modern legal thought).
40. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING § 9.2.8, at 132 (1990) (emphasizing
the need for consistency in judicial opinions). This precept has also been described as the
governing principle of analogical reasoning. See Karl-Henz Ladeur, The Analogy Between
Logic and Dialogic of Law, in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND ANALOGY 12, 18 (Patrick Nerhot ed.,
1991).
41. See BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a); supra text accompanying note 35
(quoting the fifteenth and sixteenth editions of The Bluebook).
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and legal writers fail to explain the purpose of their cf. citations.
Thus, the reader—if he or she thinks about it at all—is left to wonder
why the writer employed the cf. signal. Why was the cited primary or
secondary authority viewed as positive support for the main
proposition? Why was it viewed as less-than-direct support? Precisely
how is the cited authority different from the main proposition? In
short, what is the nexus between the authority and the proposition?
Unless that connection is made clear, the judge or law clerk who later
builds on or extrapolates from that elusive citation may move the law
in unanticipated or unintended directions. This problem becomes
especially acute as judicial caseloads and the corresponding number
of published opinions continue to grow.42 The resulting pressure to
decide more cases more quickly and to justify their rationales in
writing has the capacity to lessen the precision of citations and
citation practice.
B. Cf.’s Semiotic Function
From one perspective, this inquiry into the proper role of the cf.
signal and its practice epitomizes the elevation of quarrels about the
form of legal discourse over those concerning its substance. On the
other hand, few would contend that analogical thinking is not
essential to the development of law. If the function of the cf. signal
relates to analogical reasoning, then the use of the signal must be
accepted as an integral, organic part of legal discourse.43 This
relationship may be conveyed in terms of semiotics, the study of
systems of symbols and signs that have communicative value.
Semiotics, broadly defined as “the study of theories of
meaning,”44 attempts to explain signals’ meanings by identifying the
role that they play as “signs” in legal discourse. According to
42. See ALDISERT, supra note 40, § 1.2, at 1-2 (noting that the number of judicial
opinions submitted for publication has more than doubled in the past thirty years).
43. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 843 (arguing that the study of legal citation
“provide[s] entryways into people’s lives and the larger culture in which they live and by which
they are shaped”).
44. Reed Dickerson, Toward a Legal Dialectic, 61 IND. L.J. 315, 320 (1986). When
applied to the legal sphere, for example, structural semiotics demonstrates the dangerous (at
least from a pedagogical perspective) circularity of defining rights and duties in relation to one
another. “We might imagine, for example, a lawyer simultaneously arguing that a property
owner has the right to exclude an unauthorized entrant as a trespasser and that a person
seeking unauthorized access to privately held land is a trespasser because the property owner
has a right to exclude others.” Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1779, 1786 (1991).
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semiologists, signs are shared concepts in the form of words that take
their meanings (in part) from the language system in which they
operate, and together create culture.45 Judicial opinions, for example,
are signs; they draw upon facts and authorities to create rules that
redefine the circumstances in which the rule will be applied.46 Legal
terms are signs as well; for example, when attorneys or students
discuss the tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, that term represents a
concept or sign understood throughout the legal community.47 But the
parameters of semiotics do not end there. As Professor Jack Balkin
writes, “[t]he legal semiotician seeks to identify what might be called
the ‘grammar’ of legal discourse—the acceptable moves available in
the language game of legal discourse. These may occur at the level of
permissible argument forms, modes of factual characterization,
categories of social perception, or in many other ways.”48 Perhaps the
45. See ROBERTA KEVELSON, THE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS 4 (1988) [hereinafter
KEVELSON, SYSTEM OF SIGNS]; Paul, supra note 44, at 1798. According to Roberta Kevelson,
the foremost legal commentator on the semiotic theory of Charles S. Peirce, semiotics assumes
that:
1. All communication is a process of exchange of meaningful signs, and signs and sign
systems such as natural language mediate between communicating persons and those
objects in the phenomenal, physical world of experience to which they refer.
2. All human societies have developed complex systems of both verbal and
nonverbal sign systems which are not static but which evolve continuously to
correspond with and to represent changing social norms and the evolving, growing
social consciousness of any given community.
KEVELSON, supra, at 4 (commenting on Charles S. Peirce’s theory). “To these major underlying
assumptions I would add a third, namely, that . . . the entire notion of a legal system, consisting
of interrelating communicative processes between legal discourse and legal practice, functions
almost universally as a model of dialogic thought development.” Id.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore the possible variances of semiotic theory
as they relate to legal citation. Peirce’s second assumption, above, concurs with semiologist
Ferdinand de Saussure’s belief that signs are defined by their interaction in a system of
signification such as language. See J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and
Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1990) (explaining the basic concepts of Continental
semiology).
46. See Roberta Kevelson, Semiotics and Methods of Legal Inquiry: Interpretation and
Discovery in Law from the Perspective of Peirce’s Speculative Rhetoric, 61 IND. L.J. 355, 355
(1986) (“[A]s defined by Peirce, a judgment is a value-sign which acts to bring about an end or
goal which, ultimately, has effectual bearing on practical affairs in society.”).
47. See ROBERTA KEVELSON, CHARLES S. PEIRCE’S METHOD OF METHODS 1 (1987).
48. J.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831, 1845 (1991)
[hereinafter Balkin, Promise] (footnote omitted). Judge Patricia Wald has expressed the view
that judges perform a function related to semiotic inquiry: “One needs a sense of context in
order to get meaning out of words, in statutes as in life. . . . I ordinarily do not dabble in
semiotics. I am not a deconstructionist. Rather, I am a judge.” Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling
Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 301 (1990).
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most basic move available in legal discourse is the use of introductory
signals to evaluate and characterize authority. Signals such as cf. are
signs, too—microscopic transmitters of information within the legal
community.49
Following certain conventions—which, for the purpose of this
inquiry into legal citation, may be summarized as “citation
practice”—semioticians organize signs into meaningful systems
known as codes.50 Discovering or interpreting the “preferred
meaning” of cf. as a signifier requires review of these codes.
At the outset, one might question whether ascertaining the cf.
signal’s firm, “preferred meaning” actually benefits the legal system.
Although the rule of law should theoretically remain constant, in
actuality particular laws frequently change, demonstrating that signs
are malleable. “Law . . . may be many things, but it is not a static,
determinate, or self-contained system for deriving predetermined,
absolute, ‘correct’ answers to difficult questions.”51 Introductory
signals aid this transformation as law is characterized, applied, and
later recharacterized through citation.52 Indeed, the meaning of
contested political and social signs such as “federalism,” “feminism,”
or “states’ rights” can and arguably should drift:53
[I]f the rules for interpretation and discovery are said to be a part of
any given system of law which they govern, then it must be conceded
that the system of law, as a whole, is unstable and that this instability
is desirable. What should be apparent here is that legal reasoning,
from the realists’ point of view, if it is faithful to its pragmatic

49. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 2, at 845 (“[C]itation practices are a sort of
economy of communication . . . .”).
50. See Daniel Chandler, Semiotics for Beginners: Codes (visited Dec. 8, 1998)
<http://www.aber.ac.uk/~dgc/sem08.html> (explaining that semiotics “remind[s] us that we are
always dealing with signs, not with an unmediated objective reality”).
51. Robin Paul Malloy, A Sign of the Times—Law and Semiotics, 65 TUL. L. REV. 211,
215 (1990) (reviewing KEVELSON, SYSTEM OF SIGNS, supra note 45); see also Balkin, Promise,
supra note 48, at 1833 (“[S]igns . . . must be capable of iteration and reiteration in a diverse set
of new moral, legal, and political contexts.”).
52. See, e.g., Balkin, Promise, supra note 48, at 1833 & nn.10-11 (stating that “the first
Justice Harlan’s view that ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind,’ had a progressive (and even
radical) force in 1896 that becomes completely transformed by 1989, when it is offered by
Justice Antonin Scalia as a justification for the unconstitutionality of affirmative action
programs”) (citations omitted).
53. See discussion infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text. Once an author recognizes
Bluebook niceties—i.e., understands when meanings can shift—then the author is wellequipped to decide whether contested legal signs should shift. That is, once the “rules” are
understood, it is then more justifiable for an author to deviate from them.
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ground, must violate the traditional laws of contradiction, that is, a
legal system in the process of Becoming rather than one which is at
54
least, ideally, existent and in place.

Most signs, if they were ships, could float rudderless. The cf.
signal, however—as a device of legal discourse—is at present not
seaworthy. There is too little agreement concerning its meaning,
which negates its value as a sign.55
Of course, unexplained cf. citations provide judges with the
flexibility to refine and adapt legal doctrines to the exigencies of
justice in particular cases. But predictability in the law is integral to
individual justice and the legitimacy of our legal system. The smallest
moves in the “language game of legal discourse”56 should not be the
most consequential. The guideposts for legal analogy should not be
set in shifting foundational sands.
It is said that “not even the Emperor Augustus could effectively
mandate the meaning of a word.”57 Nonetheless, some effort should
be made to lend clarity to legal discourse where it is possible.
Authors cannot control their words once they are set upon the page
or upon a public digital medium, but readers should be able to
distinguish concepts that authors wish to leave ambiguous from those
that represent considered thought. With this goal in mind, this Article
turns to review judicial interpretation of the cf. signal, in order to
advance a pragmatic recommendation58 to reform the rules of
citation.
54. Kevelson, supra note 46, at 362.
55. See KEVELSON, supra note 47, at 5-6.
That the meaning of a sign is based on the mutual agreement between users of the
sign is one of Peirce’s major assumptions. Signs designate aspects of the real world
through contractual action . . . . Thus to speak of a fact is to speak of a community of
qualitative likenesses and differences . . . .
Id. On the other hand, cf.’s ambiguity may heighten readers’ skepticism regarding the use of
the signal to revise or even ignore authorities, which ultimately serves the semiotic goal of
exposing ideologies, “mak[ing] us aware of what we take for granted in representing the
world.” Daniel Chandler, Semiotics for Beginners: Strengths of Semiotic Analysis (visited Dec.
8, 1998) <http://www.aber.ac.uk/dgc/sem10.html>.
56. Balkin, Promise, supra note 48, at 1845.
57. Dickerson, supra note 44, at 324.
58. Considerable disagreement surrounds the question of whether semiotics is a
prescriptive or merely descriptive field. On one side of the controversy, it is argued that “legal
semiotics is useful because it will allow us to clarify hidden tensions in the law and assist us in
the continuing refinement of our moral and legal intuitions.” Balkin, Promise, supra note 48, at
1836; see also Paul, supra note 44, at 1807 & n.76. Duncan Kennedy’s work in constructing
categories of legal argumentation has been described as legal semiotics because he
“emphasized the ways in which legal concepts draw meaning from their place within broader
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II. THE Cf. SIGNAL IN PUBLISHED OPINIONS
When courts use the cf. signal, legal discourse often goes up in
smoke. A review of recent citation practice in published opinions59
reveals that, like their counterparts before the bar, the legal writers
on the bench use and interpret cf. citations in an unpredictable,
inconsistent, and occasionally outright contradictory fashion. Part of
the reason, no doubt, is that law clerks typically draft initial opinions
and judges review those drafts. But judges do not often pick over
draft opinions to check marginal signals. Thus, a sloppy signal system
permits law clerks to make (or unmake) law in ways that we do not
even notice. This Part explains the creative dilemma posed by the cf.
signal, reviews the spectrum of meanings that legal writers have
ascribed to the signal, and illustrates the cf.’s hidden communicative
possibilities.
A. Analogical Reasoning with “Cipher” Signals
Strangely, although analogical thinking is highly valued as a skill
in the practice of law, the word “analogy” often appears in the case
reports alongside “inapposite,” “speculative,” and other pejorative
words and phrases from the legal lexicon.60 In no place is this
disapprobation more apparent than in judicial decisions construing
the cf. signal. In State v. Stafford,61 for example, the North Carolina
Supreme Court appeared to draw a stark line between authority and
analogical reason by dismissing a petitioner’s citation as
improvidently based on a double jeopardy case that did “not bear
upon the matter of punishment,”62 with the following statement:

legal argument, just as semioticians have stressed the ways in which words take meaning from
their place within a larger linguistic system.” Id. at 1781-82. On the other side of the debate,
Roberta Kevelson excludes such structuralist approaches from the realm of Peircian semiotics.
See Kevelson, supra note 46, at 357.
59. The case reports contain countless examples of cf. signal usage, but this Article
cannot hope to encompass even a moderate portion of this citation practice. Instead, this
review winnows the bulk of ‘signal’ decisions to those that use or analyze the cf. signal, its
ambiguity, or its potential to mislead.
60. See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 738
(1996); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 44 (1993); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
418-19 (1992); General Elec. Co. v. Rees, 217 F.2d 595, 598 (9th Cir. 1954); State v.
Rosencrantz, 714 P.2d 93, 99 (Idaho App. 1986).
61. 164 S.E.2d 371 (N.C. 1968).
62. Id. at 376. (citing Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)); see also infra Part
II.B (discussing the entire category of similar judicial treatment).
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For [the cited court’s] statement that ‘there must be repose not
merely as to the severity of the court’s view, but as to the severity of
the crime,’ it cited no authority but suggested by way of a ‘cf.’ that
Green v. United States was sufficiently analogous to lend some
63
support to its statement.

The translation of arguably dissimilar principles and facts into
new circumstances seems integral to the production of law, but it
apparently ceases to influence some courts when preceded by the cf.
signal, becoming mere analogy.64 Perhaps analogical reasoning elicits
such disapproval because judges must spend their days employing it.65
63. Stafford, 164 S.E.2d at 376 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Although not cited
in the opinion, the language appears to track that of The Bluebook. See, e.g., BLUEBOOK
ELEVEN, supra note 33, Rule 1.2(a) (containing identical language (“sufficiently analogous to
lend some support to its statement”) to that of the court); BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3,
Rule 1.2(a) (same except for the deletion of the word “some”).
64. At least two cases demonstrate the persistence of the distinction between analogical
and controlling authority. See Local 194, Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. Standard
Brands, Inc., 540 F.2d 864, 867 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that the union had standing to bring a
Title VII action despite Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), because Warth’s cf. citation to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 suggested that the Federal Rule’s class-action requirements
were “applicable only by analogy”); United States v. Carter, 522 F.2d 666, 685 n.62 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (“The court upheld the introduction . . . and referred to [the statute] with a ‘cf.’ citation,
indicating the reference was by analogy and not a direct holding under the statute.” (citing
United States v. Angelo, 153 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1946))).
65. For example, the Supreme Court’s use of the cf. citation as analogical support in
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 185 (1989) (responding to a racial
discrimination suit by ruling that an employer violated § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act only if the
promotion would have resulted in a “new and distinct relation between the employee and the
employer”), has received criticism. The Patterson Court followed this statement with a cf.
citation to Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984), in which a law firm associate
challenged her failure to be invited into the partnership on Title VII grounds. See Patterson,
491 U.S. at 185. The Justices inferred in Patterson that the Court’s intention in Hishon was to
provide at least an example of what situation would constitute the required new relationship.
See id. at 186. However, as the Sixth Circuit subsequently noted in Holt v. Michigan Dep’t of
Corrections, 974 F.2d 771 (6th Cir. 1992), “some courts have viewed Hishon’s facts to fall
somewhere in the middle of a continuum of employment scenarios that give rise to ‘new and
distinct’ employment relations.” Id. at 774 (discussing Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185).
Judges who consider cf. citations rarely get to reproach counsel who construct improper
analogies, although such improper use can be devastating. But see Wolgin v. Magic Marker
Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168 (E.D. Pa. 1979). In this securities fraud action, the plaintiff’s motion for
class-action certification was at issue. The defendant argued that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(a)(4)—which requires that “the representatives will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class”—was not satisfied by the class, but the court vigorously rejected that
contention:
Defendant’s vehement opposition to this motion for class action certification has
apparently led defense counsel to take certain liberties with the precedents upon
which they rely. I was particularly surprised to see my own opinion in Axelrod v.
Saks & Co., 77 F.R.D. 441 (E.D. Pa. 1978)—an opinion in which I found no conflicts
of interest among the named plaintiffs and the class members, and so unhesitantly
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The result of this intensely creative enterprise is that, as often as not,
cf. analogies are misunderstood. If the author of the citation has a
later opportunity to explain,66 then the original analogy might be
recovered, but only after considerable confusion or a proliferation of
unintended consequences.
Earnest judges wander in literally every direction seeking the
elusive meaning of cryptic cf. citations. In the bulk of cases, courts
follow the definitions set out in successive editions of The Bluebook67
and attempt to construct analogies that represent positive authority
for the proposition offered.68 In some situations, however, courts use
the cf. to construct analogies that damage the suggested conclusion,
failing to recognize the original author’s motivation as well as the
substance of his or her analogy. Some courts essentially ignore
relevant cases69 or dismiss precedent introduced by the cf. signal as
certified the proposed class—cited by defendants here in support of this proposition:
“Numerous courts have viewed the presence of even a potential conflict as a ground
for summary denial of class certification.”
Id. at 174 n.1. The defendant’s citation of Axelrod was preceded by a cf. signal. The judge
continued: “One can only wonder what proposition ‘sufficiently analogous’ to the quoted
proposition derives support from Axelrod.” Id.
66. The author could, of course, explain the citation in a parenthetical. For a further
discussion of the need for parenthetical explanation when using the cf. citation, see infra Part
III.B.
67. See, e.g., Stafford, 164 S.E.2d at 376 (tracking in 1968 The Bluebook’s definition of
the cf. signal from the 1967 edition of The Bluebook (BLUEBOOK ELEVEN, supra note 33)).
68. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (summarizing past and present
definitions of signal). While Bluebook definitions of the cf. signal have shifted over time, the
common rationale underlying each change is the recognition that the cited authority, while
reliant upon different facts, at least supports the stated proposition.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Ridinger, 623 F. Supp. 1386, 1397 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(criticizing the First Circuit for ignoring relevant precedent in United States v. Acevedo-Ramos,
755 F.2d 203 (1st Cir. 1985)). In Ridinger, the district court considered an appeal from a
magistrate judge’s detention order. See Ridinger, 623 F. Supp. at 1388. The magistrate judge’s
finding included a declaration that the defendant had been involved in two murders, evidence
of which was considered in camera and was not provided to either the government’s attorneys
or the defendant and his attorney. See id. at 1389. The magistrate judge stated that AcevedoRamos supported his in camera review. See id. at 1397. Acevedo-Ramos held that a magistrate
could examine evidence in camera in a bail hearing where the government could show a
necessity for keeping sources confidential. See Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d at 208-09. The
Ridinger court, however, stated: “[W]e believe that the First Circuit looked the other way when
it decided that case.” Ridinger, 623 F. Supp. at 1397. In support of that statement, the court
pointed to two cf. cites in Acevedo-Ramos to United States v. Stanford, 551 F. Supp. 209 (D.
Md. 1982). See Ridinger, 623 F. Supp. at 1398. In Acevedo-Ramos, the judge heard testimony
from an FBI agent based on hearsay from confidential sources and the defense attorneys were
able to cross-examine that agent. See Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d at 205. The Acevedo-Ramos
court cited Stanford for the proposition that the judge can test the accuracy of evidence and
testimony by considering information in camera. See id. at 208. In fact, Stanford merely held
that, as the defendant was provided with a summary of the sealed affidavit, he did have an
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“distinguishable”—despite the fact that The Bluebook identifies
authorities so introduced as supportive authority70—and go on to
perform novel analyses. In Toledo TV Cable Co. v. Commissioner,71
for example, the United States Tax Court glossed over its previous
endorsement of an authority by stating, “our citation was preceded
by the signal ‘cf.’ which hardly connotes approval.”72
When the nation’s highest court fails to explain cryptic cf.
citations, the clarity and predictability of American law suffers
profoundly. The best example of the Supreme Court’s use of an
ambiguous cf. citation is Stone v. Powell,73 a case that many lower
federal courts74 and commentators75 have analyzed extensively.
Perhaps the Court deliberately utilized a cf. citation in order to avoid
having to define its terms, to provide needed flexibility to lower court
decisionmakers, or to avoid expansion of the Fourth Amendment.76 It
is impossible to know. The result has been time-consuming
construction, deconstruction, and extrapolation of reinventive
analogies. The Stone Court limited the relief available to prisoners
asserting Fourth Amendment violations on collateral review of their
opportunity to refute the evidence and his due process rights were not violated. See Stanford,
551 F. Supp. at 211.
70. See BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a).
71. 55 T.C. 1107 (1971).
72. Id. at 1120. The issue before the court was whether certain municipal franchises for
cable television have determinable useful lives. The petitioner relied on Birmingham News Co.
v. Patterson, 224 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ala. 1963), to show that a contract that is “subject to some
substantial renegotiation after the term of the contract has a determinable useful life.” Toledo
TV, 55 T.C. at 1119 (internal quotation marks omitted). The petitioner argued further that the
Toledo TV court had previously agreed with that proposition in David Hoffman v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 176 (1967). See Toledo TV, 55 T.C. at 1120. The Toledo court rejected
the suggested endorsement with the language quoted above. See id.
73. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
74. See infra notes 80-87.
75. See, e.g., Sam Boyte, Federal Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powell: A Remedy Only
for the Arguably Innocent?, 11 U. RICH. L. REV. 291 (1977); Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977);
Philip Halpern, Federal Habeas Corpus and the Mapp Exclusionary Rule After Stone v. Powell,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1982); Ira P. Robbins & James E. Sanders, Judicial Integrity, the
Appearance of Justice, and the Great Writ of Habeas Corpus: How to Kill Two Thirds (or More)
with One Stone, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 63 (1977); Peter McCormack, Comment, Habeas
Corpus and Due Process: Stone v. Powell Restricted, 17 HOUS. L. REV. 923 (1980); James
Turner, Comment, Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powell: The “Opportunity for Full and Fair
Litigation” Standard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521 (1978).
76. See LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 99 (1981 & Supp. 1998)
(summarizing the views of courts and commentators); see also IRA P. ROBBINS, HABEAS
CORPUS CHECKLISTS ch. 7 (1999) (discussing Stone and its progeny).
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convictions. It stated: “[W]here the State has provided an
opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,
a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial.”77 Footnote thirty-six, which
followed this assertion,78 contained only a cf. citation to the entire
case of Townsend v. Sain.79 The Court thus failed to clarify the
significance of the Townsend opinion to Stone. Nor did the
concurring opinion or either of the two dissenting opinions include
any discussion of the inscrutable reference to Townsend.
The lower federal courts have sought to make sense of the
citation, variously interpreting Townsend through the prism of Stone
to discern the following: what Stone’s footnote thirty-six does not
mean;80 what clues Stone and Townsend provide;81 whether the
77. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 (footnote omitted).
78. See id.
79. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). Townsend involved a defendant petitioning for habeas corpus
relief because his confession, which was admitted into evidence at trial, had been procured
through the use of a truth serum. The Court ruled that the standard for when a habeas court
should grant an evidentiary hearing to a petitioner is where facts are in dispute and the
defendant “did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing” at trial. Id. at 312. The opinion
listed six circumstances in which a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing. See id. at
313. It is most likely that this is the discussion in Townsend to which the Stone Court referred.
80. See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 836-40 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (finding that
the defendant had the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his claim, but failed to raise it).
The Gates court concluded that Stone and Townsend did not completely define the “full and
fair hearing” required by the Fourth Amendment:
While we are not fully appreciative of the significance of the footnoted reference, we
are persuaded that it cannot be reasonably interpreted to require a federal court to
conduct a hearing on an issue where the state prisoner, having an opportunity to do
so, never tendered the question to the state court. Such a proposition would totally
undercut the thrust and rationale of Stone.
Id. at 838. The concurring opinion in Gates similarly speculated that Stone established a very
general standard under which the courts could examine each case based on its particular facts
without deferring to the Townsend criteria. See id. at 840-44 (Oakes, J., concurring).
81. See O’Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977). In O’Berry, the Fifth
Circuit disagreed with a petitioner who claimed that Townsend defined what the Stone Court
meant by an “opportunity for full and fair litigation” of a Fourth Amendment claim. The court
stated: “[A]lthough we agree that Townsend is of some help in defining ‘full and fair
adjudication’ by a state court, we cannot . . . endorse its wholesale use” in considering whether
to hear petitioner’s claim. Id. at 1211. According to the Fifth Circuit, Townsend “applies only in
determining whether a state court has granted Petitioner a full and fair evidentiary hearing—a
hearing limited to findings of fact.” Id. The majority concluded that O’Berry involved only
legal issues, stripping the Townsend test of most of its usefulness. See id. The Fifth Circuit also
examined the cf. citation in deciding whether “full and fair” consideration requires hearings in
state trial courts as well as appellate courts, but shed little light on the controversy:
“[Consistent] with the ambiguity of the Supreme Court’s opinion, . . . sometimes ‘full and fair
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82
83
Townsend test can be “applied literally” or not; whether the Stone
Court intended to “engraft” the Townsend criteria into its holding;84
whether Stone made a “backhanded reference” to Townsend,85 so that
the Townsend test “must be filtered through the holding and
rationale of Stone before it can be applied to state court fourth
amendment proceedings”;86 and whether the Court would have been
so subtle as to premise its analysis on a case cited with a cf. signal in a
footnote.87

consideration’ means consideration by two tiers of state courts—sometimes it requires
consideration by only one.” Id. at 1213.
82. Mack v. Cupp, 564 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1977). “In Stone, the Court cited as
analogous authority Townsend v. Sain, which established criteria for determining when a
federal district court should hold an evidentiary hearing in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Id. at
900 (citation omitted). “Although . . . the Townsend test must be given great weight in defining
what constitutes full and fair consideration under Stone, we do not believe that it must always
be applied literally . . . .” Id. at 901. The Ninth Circuit concluded that Townsend’s contemplated
use of state fact-finding procedures in Fourth Amendment claims exceeded Stone’s
requirement that the state extend an opportunity for “full and fair” deliberation. See id.
83. See Dunn v. Rose, 504 F. Supp. 1333, 1337-38 (M.D. Tenn. 1981) (“Stone seems to
contemplate that, when the facts of a search-and-seizure claim are in dispute, ‘fullness and
fairness’ require a state court hearing that satisfies the criteria of Townsend v. Sain.” (citation
omitted)). In the eyes of at least one judge, the reference to Townsend was “the only
substantive indication of what the Supreme Court meant by an opportunity for full and fair
litigation.” Id. at 1338. He concluded that petitioners raising Fourth Amendment claims would
be “entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing if the state court proceedings failed to pass muster
under the Townsend criteria.” Id. The judge observed, however, that the cf. signal intimated
that the Townsend criteria were not to be applied literally: “To the extent that Townsend
[would] require[] a reweighing of the merits (e.g., determining whether the record ‘fairly
supports’ the state courts’ decision), its application would be inconsistent with the res judicata
principle underlying Stone.” Id.
84. Doleman v. Muncy, 579 F.2d 1258, 1264 (4th Cir. 1978). The court acknowledged
both the petitioner’s argument along such lines and the state’s demurral that, “[h]ad the Court
intended to engraft the Townsend v. Sain criteria into the Stone situation, it could have done so
expressly instead of by a passing footnote reference.” Id. Ultimately finding that, although
Stone required an investigation into whether there was an opportunity to raise the Fourth
Amendment claims, the court stated that the Townsend inquiry only becomes an issue if, after
the question of opportunity has been satisfied, the prisoner alleges “something to indicate that
his opportunity for a full and fair litigation of his Fourth Amendment claim . . . was in some
way impaired.” Id.
85. Palmigiano v. Houle, 618 F.2d 877, 881 (1st Cir. 1980).
86. Id. In Palmigiano, the court addressed the issue of whether the “misallocation of the
burden of proof denied petitioner a full and fair opportunity to litigate his fourth amendment
claims.” Id. The court held that “the criteria set forth in Townsend can be used as a guide in
determining whether there has been full and fair state litigation of fourth amendment claims,
[but] they are not commandments the breaking of any of which absolutely requires an
evidentiary hearing in the federal court.” Id. at 882.
87. See Willett v. Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1265, 1267-69 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that Stone’s
confusing cf. citation had led to “lower federal courts’ applying a degree of habeas review that
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Predictability of the law suffers because an author can no longer
control how the reader perceives an idea once it is committed to
paper. Unexplained cf. citations such as Stone’s notorious footnote
thirty-six exacerbate this problem and drain judicial resources on a
significant scale because authors so often fail clearly to express their
ideas in words, forcing the reader into an exhausting search for
meaning. Some of the time-consuming analogical constructions done
by the lower courts in the aftermath of Stone could have been
avoided if the Court had seen fit to reference Townsend with a
parenthetical phrase—as The Bluebook now strongly recommends
for all citations beginning with cf.—explaining why it cited Townsend,
or even provided a pinpoint citation identifying the part of the
decision that it wanted the reader interpreting Stone to apply.
Instead, unexplained cf. usages like this force diligent judges to
wander in search of—and wonder about—the meaning of these
cryptic citations. The following subsections illustrate the spectrum of
interpretations applied to ambiguous cf. citations in a host of lower
court decisions.
1. Positive or Persuasive Authority. Although cf. citations are
sometimes considered marginal or makeweight support for legal
propositions,88 courts frequently interpret authorities preceded by the
89
cf. signal as positive, contributory grounds for their conclusions. For
ranges from imperceptible to quite broad,” and concluding that “[t]he cf. signal tells us that
Townsend supports a different proposition” from that of Stone).
88. See State v. McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214, 1235 (Ariz. 1996) (Martone, J., dissenting)
(“The use of the cf. cite is a frank acknowledgment that there is no clear support for the
proposition.”); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 & n.8 (1983). Hensley cited
several cases for the proposition that a “prevailing party” for purposes of recovering attorney’s
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) is one who “succeed[s] on any significant issue.” Id. The
Court then used a cf. signal, in a footnote, to refer to a case requiring “success[] on the central
issue,” and failed to resolve the apparent conflict between these two propositions. Id.; see also
Fast v. School Dist., 728 F.2d 1030, 1032 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (stating that the Supreme Court’s
description of a legal rule as “a typical formulation” did not suggest any disagreement, and that
the only alternative rule “appears in a footnote as a parenthetical description of a holding by
another circuit, preceded by the signal ‘Cf.’”).
89. See, e.g., Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984). In
this case, the Second Circuit considered whether unsecured replacement notes evidencing loans
made by a bank were securities within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act and the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s rules. It quoted language from the Supreme Court’s
decision in Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982):
The [Marine] Court cited [with a cf. signal] Judge Wright’s concurring opinion in
Great Western Bank & Trust [v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976),] in footnote 10
as supporting authority for its holding that the “agreement, negotiated one-on-one by
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example, Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Florida v. Riley90 correctly
recognized that the cf. signal connotes supporting, though not
controlling, authority. He wrote, “[t]he opinions of both Justice
Brennan and Justice O’Connor, by their use of ‘cf.’ citations,
implicitly recognize that none of our prior decisions tells us who has
the burden of proving whether Riley’s expectation of privacy was
reasonable.”91
Even among courts that view cf. citations as positive authority,
courts assign differing weights to those authorities. In Lebowitz v.
92
Forbes Leasing & Finance Corp., a federal district court determined
that a cf. citation presented controlling authority. Lebowitz involved
a challenge to the Pennsylvania foreign attachment procedures that
was raised in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sniadach v.
93
Family Finance Corp., which struck down Wisconsin’s prejudgment
garnishment procedure because it violated due process.94 After
examining Sniadach and its progeny, the court expressed “grave
doubts” about whether the procedures followed in Pennsylvania were
constitutional.95 But it decided that it was compelled to uphold the
procedures based on two citations by the Supreme Court in Sniadach.
The first citation, introduced by a cf. signal, identified Ownbey v.
96
Morgan as supporting the conclusion that prejudgment attachments
may satisfy due process in “extraordinary situations.”97 Sniadach then
used a see signal to cite McKay v. McInnes98 for the proposition that
prejudgment attachments may satisfy due process in general if not in
every situation.99 The Lebowitz court concluded that Sniadach “at
least recognizes the vitality of Ownbey and McKay, even if it does not
impliedly approve of them.”100 Thus, the court concluded that it was
the parties, is not a security.” . . . Thus, the Court’s reference to Judge Wright’s
concurring opinion must be regarded as an approving one.
Chemical Bank, 726 F.2d at 938 n.14 (quoting Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 560).
90. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
91. Id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (addressing the Court’s holding that police
helicopter surveillance does not infringe on a homeowner’s legitimate expectation of privacy).
92. 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
93. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
94. See id. at 342
95. Lebowitz, 326 F. Supp. at 1352.
96. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
97. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339, cited in Lebowitz, 326 F. Supp. at 1352.
98. 279 U.S. 820 (1929) (per curiam).
99. See Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 340, cited in Lebowitz, 326 F. Supp. at 1352.
100. Lebowitz, 326 F. Supp. at 1353.
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bound to uphold the Pennsylvania attachment procedures, even
though it evidently felt that the Supreme Court might decide those
cases differently if presented with the opportunity.
Given the definition of the cf. signal—that it refers to authorities
that “lend support”101—cases like Lebowitz are troublesome. If
commentators are to ascribe valid meanings to introductory signals
and the citations they select, surely using authorities prefaced by the
cf. signal as positive authority to the point where it controls or
dictates a result increases ambiguity and reduces the clarity of those
decisions. Such use of the cf. imperils the quest for uniformity in
interpretation and thwarts the goal of achieving predictable outcomes
in similar cases.
2. Unclear Authority: Citation Under Weightless Conditions.
Another response to indecipherable cf. citations is to treat them as
malleable, oblique allusions to other doctrines or judges.102 Clearly
there is some value in controlled or intentional ambiguity, which use
of the cf. signal masks well. It permits judges to refrain from
pronouncing too much law, especially in situations in which they
anticipate unpredictable factual situations that may necessitate caseby-case analysis, or when dealing with controversies that implicate
broad social disputes unripe for decision. The unexplained cf. citation
introduces authority that permits the author to declaim that the
opinion contains some statement on an issue, without drawing
necessary (or even permissible) conclusions.

101. BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a). See Alaska v. Federal Energy
Regulatory Comm’n, 980 F.2d 761, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (explaining that an earlier opinion’s
use of a cf. citation to a Supreme Court case was employed because “[t]he theory underlying
both decisions is the same”); Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 726 F.2d 930, 938 n.14
(2d Cir. 1984) (setting forth the still-operative Bluebook definition of cf.—“that the cited
authority supports a proposition different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous
to lend support”—and concluding that the Supreme Court’s use of a cf. citation “must be
regarded as an approving one” (citations omitted)).
102. See Reibor Int’l Ltd. v. Cargo Carriers (KACZ-CO.) Ltd., 759 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.
1985). In this admiralty case, a vessel owner sought to garnish funds to be remitted to the
charterer under a letter of credit as funds were transferred from a Spanish bank to a Canadian
bank through New York banks. See id. at 263-64. The court agreed with the appellant’s
argument that Ratto v. Italia, 12 N.Y.S.2d 617 (City Ct. 1938), was “a fair and equitable
decision,” but decided that it was a weak precedent because the decision was based on two cf.
references. See Reibor Int’l Ltd., 759 F.2d at 267. It concluded that the decision [Ratto] is
“hardly likely to be followed by any New York court considering facts like those before us.” Id;
see also supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguous cf. reference in Stone
v. Powell).
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In Gifford v. Tiernan,103 for example, the Ninth Circuit held that
the claim of an individual who proceeded in forma pauperis,
challenging the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA),104 could be dismissed as frivolous without certification
to the court of appeals for expedited en banc review, pursuant to
FECA.105 At issue was the then-recent statement by the Supreme
Court in California Medical Ass’n v. Federal Election Commission:106
“[W]e do not construe § 437h to require certification of constitutional
claims that are frivolous . . . .”107 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that
“[i]t is not entirely clear whether this statement by the Supreme
Court refers solely to claims classified as ‘frivolous’ within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).”108 The Supreme Court had followed
its statement with an unexplained cf. citation to California Water
109
Service Co. v. City of Redding, which dealt with dismissals of
previously decided federal questions or other claims without merit.
The Ninth Circuit, left to its own devices in interpreting the case,
plugged the facts of each case into The Bluebook’s cf. definition,110
and concluded that “the Supreme Court considers dismissals as
frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) to be analogous to, but not
identical with, dismissals for lack of a substantial federal question.”111
Without further comment, the Ninth Circuit found other grounds for
its decision “that the [Supreme] Court feels that ‘insubstantial’
questions need not be certified.”112 The Supreme Court’s ambiguity,
therefore, remained unclarified.
This authorial sleight of hand allows the judiciary to retain its
normative function and resolve the present controversy while leaving
the scene with few legal fingerprints. Depending on the reader’s
perspective, such ambiguity might represent an intolerable refusal to
acknowledge and discuss patent legal conflicts. Even if it is desirable

103. 670 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1982).
104. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 11 (1972) (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431(1994)).
105. See Gifford, 670 F.2d at 883.
106. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
107. Id. at 193-94 n.14.
108. Gifford, 670 F.2d at 884 n.6.
109. 304 U.S. 252 (1938) (per curiam).
110. See Gifford, 670 F.2d at 884 n.6 (remarking that “the Supreme Court’s footnote
follows with a Cf. signal and a citation to [California Water]”).
111. Id.
112. Id.
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to eliminate intentional ambiguity,113 however, this situation may be
difficult to surmount. If judges are using the cf. signal to identify
intentional ambiguities, then proscribing deliberate vagueness may
be an inadequate solution because the author may want the issue to
be resolved either at a later time or by a different court.
3. Dismissed as Distinguishable. In many cases, courts fail to
reconcile seemingly contradictory laws and use the cf. signal as a
wildcard, interpreting the cited case with whatever weight or
significance they choose. Such behavior abnegates the author’s
intended meaning with prejudice, because The Bluebook identifies
the cf. signal as a supporting signal that may be used when the
authority is not directly on point.114 The primary mechanism through
which these courts interpret cf. references is to dismiss or discard the
cited authority as distinguishable, either in the facts stated115 or
occasionally in the legal proposition cited.116 Some decisions also
113. Intentional ambiguity is, indeed, the defining attribute of riddles:
The riddle is an arrangement of words by which is understood or suggested
something that is not expressed; or else it is an ingenious and witty description of this
unexpressed thing by means of qualities and general traits that can be attributed
quite as well to other things having no likeness or analogy to the subject.
CHARLES T. SCOTT, PERSIAN AND ARABIC RIDDLES: A LANGUAGE-CENTERED APPROACH
14 (1965) (footnote omitted).
114. See BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a).
115. See In re The American Tobacco Co., 866 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1989). The court dealt
with the issue of an appeal taken from two orders to enforce third-party subpoenas against the
appellants. See id. at 553. In Dixon v. 80 Pine Street Corp., 516 F.2d 1278 (2d Cir. 1975), the
Second Circuit analyzed the lower court’s and the merits panel’s cf. citation to United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974):
Though the citation to Nixon suggests that the merits panel may have thought that
the need for a contempt adjudication was as inappropriate for the City as the
Supreme Court thought it was for the President [in Nixon] our Court has
subsequently viewed Dixon as something of an aberration from the usual rule against
appealability. . . . Whether Dixon is to be diminished as resting on a non-precedential
order or distinguished because it involved a city and contempt had been sought
without success, it does not commit this Circuit to abandonment of [a prior rule],
which we have repeatedly acknowledged.

TO GENRE DEFINITION

American Tobacco, 866 F.2d at 555; see also infra notes 118-27 (discussing Givens v. United
States).
116. See Northern Tankers (Cyprus) Ltd. v. Backstrom, 967 F. Supp. 1391, 1401 (D.
Conn. 1997) (using a cf. citation to two cases to illustrate the difference between New York and
federal maritime law). The two appellate cases cited in Northern Tankers had both cited to
New York law and then used the cf. signal to reference federal maritime law. See Carte
Blanche (Singapore) PTE., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int’l, Inc., 2 F.3d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1993); Wm.
Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers South, Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1991).
Apparently the cf. signal indicates that the two are parallel, but not identical.
Similarly, in Marzonie v. Auto Club Insurance Ass’n, 495 N.W.2d 788 (Mich. 1992), the
Supreme Court of Michigan criticized the court of appeals’ improper use of the cf. signal, see id.
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distinguish and dismiss cited cases based on their general
inapplicability or inappropriateness, limited neither to the facts nor
to the law cited.117
118
Givens v. United States provides a nice example in this
“dismissed as distinguishable” category. In Givens, the petitioners
challenged their convictions because of delays between an original
indictment, later dismissed, and their trial on the second
indictment.119 The issue was whether the Sixth Amendment’s
guaranty of a speedy trial applied to the time interval between
dismissal of the first charge and trial on the second.120 The Givens
court considered two prior cases involving the same issue—Branch v.
121
122
United States and Robinson v. United States. In Branch, the court
held that the time interval between dismissal of a first indictment and
the filing of a second was relevant to Sixth Amendment analysis.123 In
Robinson, the court held that the same period did not apply to the
right to a speedy trial,124 following a similar rule announced in a
recent Supreme Court case, United States v. MacDonald.125 The
Robinson court cited Branch with a but cf. signal, “but did not suggest
any distinction that would allow the earlier decision to survive the
at 792 n.4, in the course of reversing the lower court’s ruling that an insured automobile driver
was entitled to personal insurance benefits for gunshot wounds sustained while occupying his
car, see id. at 793. Relying on Thornton v. Allstate Insurance Co., 391 N.W.2d 320 (Mich. 1986),
the court denied benefits to the driver because the car was not the instrumentality of his
injuries. See Marzonie, 495 N.W.2d at 793. In Thornton, however, the Michigan Supreme Court
had confronted similar facts in which “the injury could have occurred whether or not Mr.
Thornton used a motor vehicle,” Thornton, 391 N.W.2d at 327, and followed this observation
with a cf. cite to two cases, Saunders v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exch., 332 N.W.2d
613 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983), and Mann v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Insurance Exch., 314 N.W.2d
719 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), in which appellate courts had found that injuries were directly
linked to the operation of a vehicle. See Thornton, 391 N.W.2d at 327. As the Michigan
Supreme Court acknowledged, “[i]n Thornton, the abbreviation ‘Cf.’ preceded cases that were
being contrasted.” Marzonie, 495 N.W.2d at 792 n.4.
117. See, e.g., supra note 20 and accompanying text (quoting from former Circuit Judge
Bork’s vehement dissent from a denial of rehearing en banc in Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d
304 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
118. 644 A.2d 1373 (D.C. 1994) (per curiam).
119. See id. at 1373-74.
120. See id. at 1374.
121. 372 A.2d 998 (D.C. 1977).
122. 452 A.2d 354 (D.C. 1982).
123. See Branch, 372 A.2d at 1000-01.
124. See Robinson, 452 A.2d at 357-58.
125. 456 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1982) (holding that the period between the dismissal of a first
charge and a subsequent indictment is not within the comprehension of the Speedy Trial
Clause).
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holding of MacDonald.”126 Despite the Givens majority’s confusion
regarding the use of the but cf. signal, the dissent recognized the
distinction between the two cases:
In the parenthetical description following the citation to Branch, the
Robinson court stated that a “four and one-half month delay
between dismissal of [a] charge and reindictment on [that] same
charge counted for speedy trial clause purposes where dismissal
[was] unrelated to investigative need on the original charge.” . . .
[T]his description of Branch distinguishes it from the facts of
MacDonald (initial charges dismissed when prosecutor concluded
that allegations were untrue, indictment on same charges brought
after further investigation), and could be read to indicate that the
court would not apply MacDonald to a case like Branch or the
instant case, where the delays complained of are due to dismissal of
indictments without prejudice for the convenience of the
127
government.

Readers of legal materials know the difficulty inherent in
deciphering unexplained cf. citations. We may not fault the judges for
refusing to revive stillborn ideas, but surely the judiciary should not
just ignore poorly conceived analogies. The clarity of the law suffers
when published opinions fail to explain why proffered analogies must
fail. Even more importantly, our laws derive their legitimacy in part
because we know why they are maintained. It is the function of the
126. Givens v. United States, 644 A.2d 1373, 1374 n.3 (D.C. 1994) (per curiam).
127. Id. at 1376-77 (Mack, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting
Robinson, 452 A.2d at 357); see also Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co., 482 F.2d 535, 541
n.4 (5th Cir. 1973) (Simpson, J., dissenting) (“The single Court of Appeals decision cited [in the
majority opinion] under a ‘cf.’ . . . is completely inapposite . . . .”); Johnson v. Harron, No. 91CV-1460, 1995 WL 319943, at *12 & n.15 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 1995) (dismissing the defendants’
cf. citation to United States v. Esieke, 940 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1991), as inapposite because the facts
in the instant case differed); Billing v. City of Norfolk, 848 F. Supp. 630, 635-36 (E.D. Va. 1994)
(criticizing counsel’s incorrect use of the cf. signal and refusing to rely on cases presented by
the plaintiff, who claimed that the city deprived him of a liberty interest in private employment,
in part because termination of employment was not present in one case); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
W.R. Grace & Co., 794 F. Supp. 1206, 1214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (distinguishing, on factual
grounds, the defendant’s cf. citation to a case suggesting that, once triggered, a policy required
insurers to defend the insured); In re Southern Int’l Co., 165 B.R. 815, 821 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1994) (distinguishing between Fifth Circuit’s cf. reference to In re Adkins, 28 B.R. 554 (Bankr.
N.D. Miss. 1983), and the instant case by stating that the Fifth Circuit’s decision was “meant to
be binding only in those circumstances where the trustee ineffectively abandons property of the
estate”); Illini FS, Inc. v. Myerscough, 484 N.E.2d 1385, 1388 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (concluding
that a cf. citation lent support to the defendant’s argument, and stating that “[d]espite the
comparison made by the supreme court [of Illinois] we believe River Valley does not support
plaintiff’s argument. . . . It is clear the supreme court was only concerned with the original
tender which was refused not with the effect of the subsequent tender which was accepted.”).
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judiciary to review citations and rail against analogies that they
consider inapposite. Separating such flawed analogies from perfectly
devious allusions (so-called “backhanded references”128) remains a
subjective exercise, at least for the present.
4.Negative Authority and Straw Analogies. In legal discourse, as
well as in life, chaotic situations often provide cover for subtle
maneuvers. Unfortunately, the ambiguity and controversy
surrounding the cf. citation have led some legal writers to depart
from The Bluebook’s definition of the cf. citation as supporting
authority and ascribe a contradictory value to the signal, showing
extraordinary creativity in interpreting what they deem to be
ambiguous cf. citations as negative authority.129 The result is that, in
some cases, the cf. signal has been used as a lesser form of the but see
signal. The infrequent use of the but cf. signal130 use may also indicate
that cf. is not interpreted as positive support in many cases.131
Consider, for example, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Campbell
132
v. Wood. Campbell involved a habeas petitioner sentenced to death
who challenged, inter alia, the constitutionality of execution by
hanging.133 In denying his petition, the court used a cf. citation to
134
Gregg v. Georgia, and stated that the proper constitutional standard
for evaluating methods of punishment was “whether the method
involves ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”135 In
dissent, however, Judge Reinhardt criticized the majority for
128. See supra text accompanying note 85.
129. See Czerkies v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 73 F.3d 1435, 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (disagreeing flatly with a citation by the Ninth Circuit in Rodrigues
v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344 (9th Cir. 1985), and suggesting that the cited case should have been
introduced with a contra, not a cf., signal).
130. According to the sixteenth edition of The Bluebook, the but cf. signal should
indicate that the “[c]ited authority supports a proposition analogous to the contrary of the main
proposition. The use of a parenthetical explanation of the source material’s relevance . . .
following a citation introduced by ‘but cf.’ is strongly recommended.” BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN,
supra note 3, Rule 1.2(c).
131. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 153 n.6 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (analyzing a “cryptic ‘but cf.’” citation in the majority opinion); Walsh, supra note
5, at 337 (examining the use of legal citations, and distinguishing between citations that are
“weak” and those that are “strong”).
132. 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994).
133. See id. at 670.
134. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682 n.11
(using a cf. signal to cite to Gregg).
135. Campbell, 18 F.3d at 682 (quoting Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1084 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari)).
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abandoning traditional Eighth Amendment standards: “The majority
cannot cite a single case in support of its astonishing and wholly
unprecedented decision to bar the use of traditional Eighth
Amendment concepts in cases involving forms of punishment, nor
even a legal argument based on a remotely analogous case.” 136 In a
footnote, Judge Reinhardt continued: “[O]n the very same page as
the passage the majority cites, the Gregg plurality made clear that
‘excessiveness’ is only one part of any Eighth Amendment analysis.
Thus, excessive pain and disproportion are not the exclusive
considerations in Eighth Amendment analysis.”137 In effect, the
majority had used a cf. citation to Gregg to eliminate one of the
prongs of the Gregg analysis.
When left unexplained, or only partially explained, the cf.
citation is the signal that is the most vulnerable to unanticipated
interpretations. Judges are effectively granted license to take the
cited cases out of context. The signal thus absorbs some criticism
from observers irritated at what they perceive as the use of Bluebook
niceties to present slightly tweaked renditions of the same law.138 For
example, during the course of the Iran-Contra Affair litigation, D.C.
Circuit Judge (now Chief Judge) Harry Edwards complained in his

136. Id. at 703 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
137. Id. at 703 n.19 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
138. See, e.g., Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity, Habeas Corpus, and the Death
Penalty: An Unholy Alliance, 41 DUKE L.J. 160, 172-73 (1991) (criticizing a distinction drawn in
a cf. citation in Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990), to United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897 (1984)). In Butler, a state prisoner attacked his conviction via a petition for federal habeas
relief alleging that he had been interrogated after having requested counsel for a separate
investigation. See Butler, 494 U.S. at 410. The Court held that his claims were barred by the
doctrine against retroactive application of new rules of constitutional criminal law a nnounced
in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 315 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). See Butler, 494
U.S. at 415. The Court in Butler stated, “[t]he ‘new rule’ principle therefore validates
reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though
they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.” Id. at 414. This statement was supported by a
cf. citation to United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19, with a parenthetical observing that the
exclusionary rule should not “deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity.” Id.
In dissent, Justice Brennan rejected this proposition and the authority it used for support:
The Court’s analogy between the deterrent function of federal habeas and the
deterrent function of the exclusionary rule . . . is unsound, for the purported analogy
continues to beg the question of what conduct ought to be deterred. . . . Given the
difference between the nature of police conduct at issue in Leon and judicial
interpretation, the majority’s proffered analogy is flawed. It ultimately does no more
than borrow language from Leon, and . . . fails to justify the majority’s decision to
embrace a “reasonableness” test as the appropriate objective of state-court
adjudication.
Id. at 425-26 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (second emphasis added).
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opinion, In re Sealed Case,139 that Independent Counsel Lawrence
Walsh had not explained the nature of an analogical argument:
The Independent Counsel cites three cases for the proposition
that personal jurisdiction over the individual served with a subpoena
is enough to compel him to produce documents belonging to
companies he represents. [He] introduces these cases with the signal
“Cf., e.g.” Here, however, even that notoriously enigmatic signal has
been taxed beyond its limits. We view with profound disfavor the
Independent Counsel’s disingenuous attempt to enlist prior holdings
140
in the service of doctrines they in no wise support.

Although it is impossible to know what motivates legal writers to
construe the cf. as negative authority, at least two unsavory
possibilities exist. First, courts may deliberately misunderstand the
original argument and invent negative analogies in order to obscure
an author’s intended analogies. Second, courts may create weak
positive analogies—analogical straw men—whose patent lack of
persuasiveness contributes to courts’ contradictory rulings. Needless
to say, either insidious possibility subverts meaningful legal discourse.
Likewise, because it is seen alternately as persuasive, unclear,

139. 832 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Judge Edwards ruled that the Independent Counsel
had to demonstrate personal jurisdiction over certain companies (not merely upon the
subpoenaed witness as a “custodian”) in order to view their documents, stating that “[t]he
Independent Counsel has adduced no authority to the contrary.” Id. at 1273.
140. Id. at 1273 n.3 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court could not determine
what analogies Lawrence Walsh intended to draw:
It is hard to imagine what parallel the Independent Counsel purports to find . . . . An
analogy would exist were the Independent Counsel able to show that the Witness has
done business in the United States on behalf of the companies sufficient to give an
American court jurisdiction over them, but [he] has not attempted to do so. . . .
Again, the analogy the Independent Counsel apparently sees is elusive. The third
case cited . . . is even further off point . . . .
Id.
This problem persists when litigants question cf. citations on appeal because courts can
more easily articulate how they feel about a decision than why they feel that way. For example,
in Hunt v. Gan-Trade Corp., No. H-89-2379, 1997 WL 314384 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 1997), the
court dealt with a challenge to a decision of the Interstate Commerce Commission on the
ground that its action was arbitrary and capricious. See id. at *1. The court disagreed because
the Commission introduced a case on which it relied with a cf. signal:
This argument fails because the Commission only cited Amoco Fabrics as “cf.”
authority . . . . A “cf.” cite simply means that the cited case, while standing for a
proposition different from the one stated, lends some support. The trustee does not
attack the proposition for which the case was cited: only whether the case directly
supports it. The Court finds that the case was sufficient as cited, and the
Commission’s decision was not rendered arbitrary and capricious as a result.
Id. at *3 n.2.
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ignored, dismissed, or misunderstood, the cf. signal scrambles legal
communications.
III. THE Cf. SIGNAL: THE CIPHER TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING IN
LEGAL DISCOURSE141
A. Decoding Bluebook Signals
As previously explained, legal semioticians can fashion codes
that consolidate related signs to provide context for understanding
and to illuminate the distinctive value or “preferred meaning” of a
particular sign.142 Unfortunately, however, the foregoing review of
citation practice in the legal community suggests that, in reality, the
use of the cf. signal is generally standardless. The only common
denominator is that there is no common denominator. Considering
the extent to which legal writers attempt to evince conformity with
citation manuals such as The Bluebook, this conclusion suggests that
these citation manuals fail to guide legal writers in a way that allows
them to harness the cf.’s communicative potential. This Part
considers why the signal definitions in The Bluebook—legal citation’s
prevailing code—fail to do so.
The sixteenth edition of The Bluebook identifies six signals that
buttress propositions ([no signal], accord, see, see also, cf.,143 and
compare—the last of which is segregated as a “[s]ignal that suggests a
useful comparison,”144 for no apparent reason), two signals that
introduce contradictory statements in the same manner (but see and
but cf.), and two signals that inform the reader that other authorities
discuss subject matter related to the proposition (see generally, and
145
e.g. combined with any other signal). The Bluebook organizes these
signals in groupings that range from “[s]ignals that indicate

141. Cf. Part I of this Article, supra, in which I intentionally avoided use of the cf. in my
citations. Since the reader is now at the stage in this Article at which the suggested rules of use
for the cf. signal are outlined, use of the cf. is less ambiguous, and, therefore, I succumb. See
generally Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1791 (reviewing the fifteenth edition of The Bluebook as well
as several other citation manuals and pointing out the irony of the “ever-changing uniform
system of citation”).
142. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
143. See BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a).
144. Id., Rule 1.2(b).
145. See id., Rule 1.2.
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support”146 or “[s]uggest[] a useful comparison,”147 to negative
authority,148 background material,149 and other matters.150 Within each
grouping, The Bluebook appears to order signals by weight. Signals
attributing quotes ([no signal], accord) precede see, which “directly
151
states or clearly supports the proposition.” Just as beauty lies in the
eye of the beholder, the weight of an authority lies in the mind of the
citation writer, and not merely because he or she often may employ a
three-hundred-plus page manual for citation practice. The writer
must make some representation concerning how strongly the cited
authority supports the given proposition.
Legal writers are receiving strange messages. Consider that, after
see, The Bluebook explains see also, which “constitutes additional
source material that supports the proposition . . . [and] is commonly
used to cite an authority supporting a proposition when authorities
that state or directly support the proposition already have been cited
or discussed.”152 The see also signal presumably introduces authority
of lesser weight because authorities so cited do not state or “clearly”
support the proposition. Yet the inclusion of “also” in the signal’s
name implies that authors must find clear support for their
propositions if no authority is mentioned in the text. Few writers use
“also” as the first word of a new, pivotal paragraph. Furthermore, the
definition assumes the presence of additional source material. Every
writer’s first source must therefore constitute clear support! This
definition places pressure on legal writers to overstate their
confidence in sources.
The Bluebook then turns to the nettlesome cf. signal, which it
defines as follows: “Cited authority supports a proposition different
from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to lend support.
Literally, ‘cf.’ means ‘compare.’ The citation’s relevance will usually
be clear to the reader only if it is explained. Parenthetical
explanations . . . , however brief, are therefore strongly recommended.”153 This definition puts a new spin on the see also problem.
146. Id., Rule 1.2(a).
147. Id., Rule 1.2(b).
148. See id., Rule 1.2(c).
149. See id., Rule 1.2(d).
150. See id., Rule 1.2(e).
151. Id., Rule 1.2(a).
152. Id.
153. Id. Of course, in legal citation cf. cannot actually mean compare, as there is a
discrete signal, appropriately termed “compare.” See id., Rule 1.2(b).
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Whereas the see also definition appears to exert pressure on authors
to characterize their strongest authority as clear support, from a
deconstructive perspective the cf. signal’s definition contains the
premise that authority supporting only “a proposition different from
the main proposition” cannot be clear support. This normative
judgment denigrates the vital role of analogy in the understanding of
law.
The current Bluebook code contains and transmits important
messages about legal discourse. Under the guise of ordering signals
by weight, The Bluebook subtly urges writers to inflate principal
authorities and relegate analogical reasoning to the nether province
of makeweight authority. Introductory signals assist in the
transmission of complex legal discourse. They should be lighter than
air. Or, at the very least, they should not carry this kind of baggage.
We should consider a new series of definitions.
B. New Signal Definition and Citation Practice
Clearly what writers need to agree to, in the search for a
consistent154 and meaningful cf. citation, is a systematized approach to
its use. The cf. signal should be used when providing support that is
“sufficiently analogous” to the proposition stated.155 A general cf.
citation to an entire case can lead the reader to create his or her own
analogy by searching through the text of the judicial opinion for
meaning from the cf. reference, and to speculate about the weight
154. Seldom is Emerson’s trenchant warning more appropriate than with regard to
signals used in legal discourse: “a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds.” RALPH
WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF RALPH WALDO
EMERSON 43, 57 (1903) (emphasis added); see also ALDISERT, supra note 40, § 9.2, at 132
(arguing that ensuring consistency in judicial decisionmaking is a key to the value of stare
decisis).
155. BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a). Analogical reasoning underpins the
value in, and meaning behind, using introductory signals at all. In fact, analogy “makes possible
a new kind of reasoning which leads to an innovative representation.” Ladeur, supra note 40, at
17 (footnote omitted). “[A]nalogy signals a moment of invention, based on the understanding
of the concrete situation, which resists the logical-syntactical paradigm of deduction.” Id. at 18
(footnote omitted). Analogy is governed “by the principle of legal equality, which dictates that
different cases with the same essential features are to be disciplined using the same treatment.”
Giuseppe Zaccaria, Analogy as Legal Reasoning, in LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND LEGAL
ANALOGY, supra note 40, at 55 (footnotes omitted).
Zaccaria goes on to discuss the criticism that analogical reasoning is “unscientific
because of its insufficient precision.” Id. at 56. Even accepting that perfect precision in any
analytical written work is unlikely to be attained, albeit continually striven for, some increased
consistency in the forms attached to analogical reasoning can certainly be encouraged. See id.
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that any inferred analogy should be given. While this sort of general
reference may be the express intention of the legal writer,156 it is
equally likely to mask a more esoteric phenomenon: lack of
intellectual rigor in finding support for the main proposition. General
cf. citations, or more troubling cf. usage that offers an inaccurate
citation to the proposition cited,157 fosters an atmosphere in which
imprecision becomes the byword in the use of the cf. Such a situation
is intolerable if the cipher is to be clarified and the law and its
development are to have fair meaning. The power of interpretation
may well lead to misapprehension and ultimately to signal loss,
particularly when the meaning of a citation is obscure and
inscrutable. This lamentable eventuality defeats the primary purposes
of having signals at all, which are to enable access to materials, to
indicate the weight accorded to authority, and to prompt the author
and reader to analyze the relevance of citation questions.158
156. Ambiguity may be inevitable in judicial decisionmaking; it might also be good. See
Halpern, supra note 75, at 41 (presenting as one option in analysis of the Supreme Court’s lack
of use of a parenthetical or pinpoint cite in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), that the
majority may well have deliberately omitted a clear referent; they may have wanted the lower
courts to determine for themselves the factors involved in measuring whether a “full and fair
hearing” was given).
This Article focuses on semiotics as a theoretical construct to analyze signals as signs or
codes through which legal discourse occurs. Another approach—deconstruction—could provide
some explication of deliberate vagueness in citation usage. Deconstruction is “a movement that
insists that the gaps and corners and slippages in texts—the words not chosen—are as
important to its meaning as the ‘central ideas’ studied in traditional forms of interpretation.”
Coombs, supra note 2, at 1100; see also id. at 1100 n.5 (citing JACQUES DERRIDA, OF
GRAMMATOLOGY (1976)). Thus cf. usage can be as important for what it does say (when an
explanatory parenthetical phrase is added) as for what it does not say (when the citation is left
unexplained). Further application of deconstruction to the nuances of cf. practice is beyond the
scope of this Article.
157. See supra notes 129-40 and accompanying text (discussing judicial decisions that
either use cf. as negative authority or that take that signal completely out of context); see also
Metzner, supra note 138, at 170-74 (discussing Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990)). This
case provides an excellent example of disagreement in interpretation between majority and
dissent, such that the latter accuses the former of citing a case out of context. See Butler, 494
U.S. at 419-21. The dissent in Butler believed that the connection between the deterrent
function of the exclusionary rule on police and the deterrent function of habeas corpus on state
courts was a tenuous one. See id. at 425 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 138
(quoting the dissent at length). Thus, even where a parenthetical is used, it is key that the writer
be explicit about the meaning the reader ought to glean from the citation; otherwise, the law
remains undefined, and the cipher remains intact.
158. See WEINER, supra note 18, at 223 (analyzing the “virtually cryptographic code”
used to signal what weight, if any, should be given to a particular citation); Coombs, supra note
2, at 1105-06, 1110 (depicting the purpose of citations as providing a reference point for further
research and claiming that standard citation forms use linguistic ambiguity in order to avoid
making strong and exacting analogies); Dickerson, supra note 2, at 69 (stating that authors use

ROBBINS FINAL.DOC07/26/99 8:33 AM

1076

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:1043

Regarding the cf. signal, Rule 1.2(a) of the sixteenth edition of
The Bluebook posits: “The citation’s relevance will usually be clear to
the reader only if it is explained. Parenthetical explanations . . . ,
however brief, are therefore strongly recommended.”159 There are at
least three possible approaches to tackling the problems inherent in
the current state of cf. usage. First, the citation rule could remain
exactly as it is. Thus, parentheticals, “however brief,”160 would
continue to be strongly recommended. This solution is inadequate,
because it merely recommends and does not mandate parentheticals.
It was, in fact, the recommendation in both the fifteenth and
sixteenth editions of The Bluebook. Indeed, Lambrix v. Singletary161
came down from the Supreme Court after the sixteenth edition had
already been published, and yet the Court included no parenthetical
explanation for its cf. citation. Thus, a strong recommendation still
may not address documented signal loss.
The second approach goes one step further. Parenthetical
explanations should continue to be strongly recommended; in
addition, the recommendation would state that parentheticals should
be both relevant and substantive. This rewording would solve many,
but not all, of the problems associated with use of the cf. signal.
Notably, an author’s intention would be more clearly delineated,
which consequently would minimize the searches for meaning
undertaken by readers looking for greater precision in judicial
decisionmaking. If the writer chose to ignore this strong
recommendation, however, the reader again would be in a position to
interpret the citation as he or she chose. This reform does not
proscribe deliberate vagueness. Rather, it clarifies that unexplained
citations actually represent undecided and inconstant elements in the
law. But this solution falls short of eliminating the problem caused by
current usage of the cf. signal.
This Article recommends a third approach. Parenthetical
explanations should not only be both relevant and substantive, but
they should also be mandatory. This approach minimizes the
disconnect between authors and readers when, for example, a
pinpoint citation is given, but no explanation of its relevance is
signals to indicate the weight to be accorded to a given authority). But see Walsh, supra note 5,
at 338 (stating that “citations potentially open a window to better understanding of judicial
decisionmaking”).
159. BLUEBOOK SIXTEEN, supra note 3, Rule 1.2(a).
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text (discussing Lambrix).
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mentioned. Rule 1.2(a) of The Bluebook should explicitly promote
this goal of reasoned elaboration, rather than implicitly downplay the
role of analogical reasoning in legal discourse.
In accordance with the foregoing discussion, I recommend the
following revisions (with additions underlined and deletions
indicated) to assist in clarifying the connection between citation
signals and analogical legal reasoning. For completeness, I include
recommended changes not only for the cf. signal, but also for other
signals where appropriate for clarity or consistency. Rule 1.2 should
read as follows:
Introductory Signals
(a)

Signals that indicate support.

[no signal]

Cited authority (i) identifies the source of a quotation,
or (ii) identifies an authority referred to in text.

Accord

“Accord” is commonly used when two or more cases
clearly support the proposition but the text quotes
only one; the others are then introduced by “accord.”
Similarly, the law of one jurisdiction may be cited as
being in accord with that of another.

See

Cited authority directly states or clearly supports the
proposition.

See also

Cited authority constitutes additional less significant
source material that nonetheless clearly supports the
proposition. “See also” is commonly used to cite an
authority supporting a proposition when the most
significant authorities that directly state or directly
clearly support the proposition already have been
cited or discussed. The use of a parenthetical
explanation of the source material’s relevance (rule
1.5) following a citation introduced by “see also” is
encouraged strongly recommended.
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Cf.

Cited authority supports a proposition different from
the main proposition but is sufficiently analogous to
lend support to the proposition. Literally, “cf.” means
compare. Parenthetical explanations (rule 1.5),
however brief, are therefore strongly recommended.
should be employed because The citation’s the
authority’s relevance will usually be clear to the
reader only if it is explained. Unexplained “cf.”
citations may be construed generously by the reader.

Compare . . .
[and] . . .
with . . .
[and] . . .

Comparison of the authorities cited will offer support
for or illustrate the proposition. The relevance of the
comparison will usually be clear to the reader only if it
is explained. Parenthetical explanations (rule 1.5)
following each authority are therefore strongly
recommended.

(c) (b)

Signals that indicate contradiction.

But see

Cited authority directly states or clearly supports a
proposition contrary to the main proposition. “But
see” is used where “see” would be used for support.

But cf.

Cited authority supports a proposition analogous to
the contrary of the main proposition. The use of a
parenthetical explanation of the source material’s
relevance (rule 1.5) following a citation introduced by
“but cf.” is strongly recommended. Parenthetical
explanations (rule 1.5), however brief, should be
employed because the authority’s relevance will be
clear to the reader only if it is explained. Unexplained
“but cf.” citations may be construed generously by the
reader.

These proposed definitions would obviate many of the problems
associated with current cf. usage. The proposed explanation of the cf.
signal ties creation of a mandatory parenthetical to the quality of the
legal reasoning used.
If the goals of judicial decisionmaking include clarity and
avoidance of ambiguity, then controlled ambiguity should be the
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byword of opinion writers and Bluebook watchdogs. With controlled
ambiguity—in which the writer determines, through explanatory
parentheticals, the extent of reliance that he or she intended to
convey—I believe that taking the reader through a reasoning process
or pointing the reader in the direction in which the writer wants
future readers to go will have numerous benefits. It will minimize
undue discretion in the hands of the frustrated reader, lead the
opinion writer to greater understanding by forcing him or her to
justify the reasoning employed, encourage greater adherence by the
reader to whatever principle or precedent the writer intended to
allude, and ultimately result in a minimization of signal loss.
CONCLUSION
Introductory legal citation signals have been criticized for
obscuring, rather than enlightening, the relevance of cited materials.
Where a signal is used incorrectly, misapprehension is inevitable.
Equally problematic, however, is signal use that leads to unintended
ambiguous interpretation by the reader. This Article brings to light
how one seemingly trivial legal citation signal, the cf., has been used
in judicial decisions—sometimes helpfully, but typically not.
Improper usage has led to frustrating (but colorful) commentary
from legal writers and thinkers as they try to decipher precedent. For
example:


One can only wonder what proposition ‘sufficiently analogous’
to the quoted proposition derives support from [the precedent
162
cited].



The temptation to exaggerate a decision with which one
disagrees, thereby to make it an easy target for slings and
163
arrows, ought to be resisted.



The Court’s analogy between the deterrent function of federal
habeas and the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule . . . is
164
unsound[;] . . . the majority’s proffered analogy is flawed.

162. Wolgin v. Magic Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168, 174 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
163. Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 315 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (statement of Wright
& Ginsburg, JJ., citing Dronenberg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1582-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(separate statement of Bork, J.)).
164. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 425-26 n.6 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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[The cited case] is not entirely on point, although the Court does
165
not explain what distinction it has in mind.



In [a previously cited case], the abbreviation “cf.” preceded
166
cases that were being contrasted.



Here, . . . even that notoriously enigmatic signal has been taxed
beyond its limits . . . [and the court] view[s] with profound
disfavor the . . . attempt to enlist prior holdings in the service of
167
doctrines they in no wise support.

Given the inconsistent approach to and considerable confusion
associated with cf. usage—best exemplified by those cases that
actually use the cf. as negative authority, completely ignoring many
generations of Bluebook definitions declaring it to be positive
authority—the very integrity of legal reasoning by analogy is at stake.
One commentator neatly summarized a constructive approach to
improved citation writing: “Sure, there are problems with law review
footnotes, but let’s just roll up our sleeves and take care of them.”168
The solution to the problems of the cf. signal is mandatory
parenthetical explanations or elaborations that are both relevant and
substantive. The benefits of this approach, as well as of accurate and
consistent signal use generally, are many: jurisprudence is more
definite, because explanations for having cited a particular precedent
are readily at hand; writers’ intentions are clearer, because an
analogy is attached to the cited authority; and readers’ attempts to
create their own analogies, or to vary weight assigned to a given
citation, are thwarted by the existence of relevant and substantive
mandatory parentheticals. These benefits ultimately will result in
better guidance to judges, lawyers, and litigants, as well as in a
broader understanding of judicial decisionmaking. Most importantly,
tightening the definition of the cf. signal, along with the rules for its
use, will help to preserve the primary pillar of common law
jurisprudence: reasoning by analogy.

165. Parren v. State, 523 A.2d 597, 609 (Md. 1987).
166. Marzonie v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 495 N.W.2d 788, 792 n.4 (Mich. 1992).
167. In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1273 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
168. Patrick M. McFadden, Fundamental Principles of American Law, 85 CAL. L. REV.
1749, 1750 (1997). McFadden then supported his supposition with a creative cf. reference: “Cf.
PLACES IN THE HEART (Tri-Star 1984) (former flying nun does what it takes to bring in the
cotton and save the farm).” Id. at n.3.

